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The	in-between	of	being	a	civilian	and	combatant	–
circular	return	in	eastern	DR	Congo	#LSEReturn
Koen	Vlassenroot,	Emery	Mudinga	and	Josaphat	Musamba	Bussy	tackle	the	complexities	around	the	remobilisation
of	armed	combatants	following	conflict	and	introduce	new	ways	to	look	at	it.
	
This	article	is	part	of	our	#LSEReturn	series,	exploring	themes	around	Displacement	and	Return.
In	this	article,	we	introduce	the	notion	of	circular	return	to	explain	the	permanent	state	of	mobility	between	civilian	and
combatant	life	of	combatants.	The	phenomenon	is	widely	seen	in	eastern	DRC,	where	thousands	of	Congolese
youth	have	been	going	in	and	out	of	armed	groups	for	several	decades	now.	While	the	notion	of	circular	return	has
its	origins	in	migration	and	refugee	studies,	we	argue	that	it	also	serves	as	a	useful	lens	to	describe	and	understand
processes	of	incessant	armed	mobilisation.	In	conceptualising	these	processes	as	forms	of	circular	return,	we	want
to	move	beyond	the	remobilisation	discourse,	dominant	both	in	DDR	literature	and	policy	speech.	This	discourse
tends	to	be	too	security	oriented,	emphasising	the	security	threat	of	armed	mobilisation	and	the	failure	of	DDR
processes	and	the	institutions	supporting	them.	More	importantly,	it	ignores	combatants’	agency	and	larger
processes	of	socialisation	and	social	rupture,	which	are	key	drivers	of	armed	(continued)	mobilisation.	We	argue	that
armed	groups	are	experiments	in	creating	new	social	spaces,	providing	new	forms	of	social	capital	and	constituting
new	identities.	Circular	return	points	at	combatants’	capacity	to	navigate	between	these	new	spaces	and	older	ones.
Circular	displacement
Recently	introduced	concepts	such	as	‘circular	migration’,	‘circular	mobilities’,	‘split	return’	or	‘recycled	refugees’,	all
recognise	the	mobility	of	migrant	or	refugee	populations	and	point	at	the	repeated	migration	experiences	between	an
origin	and	destination	involving	several	migrations	and	returns.	While	circular	migration	as	part	of	human	mobility	is
not	a	new	phenomenon,	it	only	recently	received	wider	recognition	both	in	literature	and	policy	statements.	Little
agreement	exists	on	its	definition.	Schneider	and	Parusel	f.i.	understand	circular	migration	as	“a	flexible	form	of
repetitive	movement	between	different	destinations.”	Other	definitions	point	at	the	developmental	impact	or	at	its
voluntariness	and	legal	aspects.	For	the	Global	Forum	on	Migration	and	Development,	circular	migration	refers	to
“the	fluid	movement	of	people	between	countries,	including	temporary	or	long-term	movement	which	may	be
beneficial	to	all	involved,	if	occurring	voluntarily	and	linked	to	the	labour	needs	of	countries	of	origin	and	destination.”
Displacement	literature	equally	recognises	the	existence	in	certain	cases	of	a	permanent	condition	of	mobility	of
Internally	Displaced	People	(IDP)	and	refugees,	recently	also	described	as	‘pendular	mobility’	or	‘circular	return’.	In
conflict	environments,	pendular	mobility	of	IDPs	points	at	mobility	as	a	way	of	life,	or	as	a	permanent	condition	and
strategy	to	seek	for	security	and	protection,	including	the	daily	return	to	what	are	considered	safer	areas	to	spend	the
night.	At	the	same	time,	circular	return	refers	to	a	rather	a-typical	dynamic	linked	to	displacement,	which	is	the	return
of	refugees	to	their	host-communities	mainly	as	a	consequence	of	failed	return	and	reintegration	at	‘home’.
The	cycle	of	mobilisation	–	demobilisation	–	remobilisation
Similar	patterns	of	pendular	mobility	can	be	identified	among	members	of	armed	groups.	A	constant	cycle	of
mobilisation	–	demobilisation	–	remobilisation	as	observed	in	eastern	Congo,	both	points	at	the	persistence	of	drivers
of	mobilisation	and	the	failures	of	demobilisation	efforts.	This	cycle	has	been	documented	at	large,	and	several
reasons	behind	its	persistence	have	been	discerned.	Reasons	for	its	existence	include	the	perseverance	of
unresolved	conflict	dynamics;	the	proliferation	of	a	rising	number	of	small	armed	groups,	contributing	to	a
fragmentation	of	the	military	landscape;	the	growing	involvement	of	low-level	political	actors	in	armed	mobilisation
leading	to	a	democratisation	of	militarised	politics;	failures	of	demobilisation	and	reintegration	efforts;	and	disruptive
military	responses.	What	received	far	less	attention	in	existing	analysis	is	the	position	of	ex-combatants	themselves,
and	their	incentives	to	regularly	rejoin	armed	groups.
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Armed	combatants	in	DR	Congo	Image	Credit:	Josaphat	Musamba
A	rich	literature	on	ex-combatants	and	their	mobility	in	post-conflict	settings	has	documented	cases	including	El
Salvador,	Sierra	Leone,	Mozambique,	Liberia,	Colombia,	Burundi	and	the	DR	Congo.	Most	analyses	label	the
pendular	mobility	of	combatants,	or	the	continuous	mobility	between	combatant	and	civilian	spaces,	in	terms	of
remobilisation.	It	is	argued	that	combatants,	despite	organised	or	voluntary	demobilisation	and	reintegration,	often
risk	returning	to	the	bush	and	rejoin	their	former	comrades	or	risk	moving	to	alternative	armed	groups.	In	other	cases,
combatants	respond	to	calls	from	politicians	or	other	Big	Men	who	strategically	rely	on	(networks	of)	ex-combatants
and	other	marginalised	youth	for	their	own	(political)	campaigns	or	in	defense	of	private	interests,	a	phenomenon
described	by	Christinsen	and	Utas	as	‘politricks’.	And	in	still	other	cases,	ex-combatants	are	considered	responsible
for	persistent	levels	of	insecurity	because	of	their	assumed	involvement	in	organised	crime	and	crime	networks	after
the	war	has	ended.
All	of	these	scenarios	incite	the	need	for	DDR	programmes,	which	are	considered	a	crucial	part	of	peace	building
strategies.	For	Wiegink,	who	studied	the	case	of	Renamo	in	Mozambique,	these	programmes	start	from	two
misleading	assumptions.	One	is	that	“ex-combatants	would	naturally	want	to	return	‘home’,”	without	taking	into
consideration	what	home	is	and	how	it	changed	during	the	war.	The	second	assumption	is	that	armed	groups	are
considered	mainly	as	military	structures	that	can	easily	be	dismantled,	ignoring	the	fact	that	they	also	entail	a	web	of
social	relationships.	As	the	case	of	Sierra	Leone	reveals,	war-time	mobilisation	networks	tend	to	continue	after	the
termination	of	conflict.	The	same	can	be	said	about	the	networks	of	solidarity	and	support	between	ex-combatants.
As	Wiegink	observes	in	the	case	of	Renamo,	ex-combatants	do	not	simply	fade	away,	but	continue	to	be	an
important	identity	in	post-war	politics	and	society.
These	realities	help	to	explain	why	armed	structures	remain	an	option	to	those	who	have	left	them	even	after	the
formal	end	of	war.	While	the	return	to	armed	struggle	is	a	“profoundly	multi-layered	and	social	process,”	so	is	the
individual	decision	to	take	part	in	it.	The	narrative	of	remobilisation,	however,	obscures	the	complexities	explaining	it.
It	is	mainly	understood	in	terms	of	a	return	to	violence	and	combat,	itself	the	result	of	“an	interaction	between
entrepreneurs	of	violence,	military	affinities,	intermediaries,	and	selective	incentives.”	More	importantly,	it	pays	little
attention	to	the	agency	of	those	being	mobilised,	the	larger	social	processes	and	context	leading	to	a	return	to	armed
combat,	the	effects	of	long-term	membership	of	armed	groups	and	the	socialisation	process	this	membership	entails.
Therefore,	we	argue	that	there	is	a	need	move	away	from	framing	combatant	mobility	in	terms	of	remobilisation	and
understand	it	as	a	process	of	circular	return,	which	describes	more	precisely	the	constant	in-and-out	of	combatants.
Circular	return	in	eastern	Congo
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Also	in	the	case	of	eastern	DR	Congo,	where	several	generations	of	local	youth	have	joined	rurally-based	armed
groups,	rebel	movements	or	local	defense	forces,	both	during	and	after	the	Congo	wars,	attempts	to	disarm	and
demobilise	them	have	had	limited	effect	and	armed	structures	have	also	shown	strong	resilience	to	DDR	efforts.	Ex-
combatants	often	decide	to	return	to	these	armed	groups	or	respond	to	opportunities	provided	by	newly	created
ones.	In	Shabunda	(South	Kivu),	Kalehe	(South	Kivu)	or	Masisi	(North	Kivu)	and	other	areas	of	research,	we
observed	how	local	youth	constantly	navigate	between	their	position	and	role	of	combatant	and	civilian.	Being	part	of
two	different	social	environments	has	become	a	permanent	condition	of	life	and	is	guided	by	a	complex	interplay
between	social	and	political	dynamics,	collective	needs	and	grievances,	and	individual	interests.	Yet,	at	the	same
time	the	mobility	between	these	different	spaces	suggest	that	boundaries	between	civilian	and	combatant	spheres
are	less	strict	than	generally	assumed.	Not	everyone	prefers	to	stay	in	this	state	of	pendular	mobility.	Those	who
received	considerable	advantages	(such	as	a	motor-bike)	as	part	of	reinsertion	programmes,	usually	do	not	return	to
the	armed	group	to	which	they	belonged.	Others,	however,	have	limited	access	to	alternative	opportunities	and	find	it
more	difficult	to	cut	the	links	with	their	former	comrades	and	commanders.	This	could	be	because	of	strong
pressures	of	rebel	commanders,	leading	to	‘forced	circular	return’	as	we	observed	in	Shabunda	with	the	Raya
Mutomboki	or	in	Masisi	with	APCLS	members.	It	could	be	a	result	of	shifts	in	the	security	context	and	the	consequent
need	to	protect	the	community,	revealing	a	permanent	state	of	readiness	of	ex-commanders.	It	could	be	out	of
frustration	with	the	limited	benefits	and	results	of	reintegration	into	society	and	the	difficulties	to	return	to	civilian	life.
It	could	be	out	of	nostalgia	with	the	material	and	social	advantages	of	combatant	life,	explained	by	one	combatant	as
“kukula	kwa	bure”,	or	the	habit	to	“eat	without	too	many	efforts	required”.	It	could	be	because	of	the	attractiveness	of
the	dawa	medicine,	which	is	mobilised	as	a	combat	tactic	yet	also	providing	spiritual	guidance	and	protection	to
combatants.	And	finally,	while	demobilisation	programmes	provide	exit-strategies	that	could	be	considered
opportunities	to	resist	against	armed	groups	and	their	command	structures,	a	return	to	the	same	groups	could	be	a
form	of	resistance	against	reintegration	efforts	and	against	new	social	codes	of	conduct,	norms	and	values	ex-
combatants	are	confronted	with	and	are	considered	as	not	corresponding	with	their	own	values	and	norms.
Processes	of	socialisation
In	short,	the	circular	return	of	combatants	is	inspired	by	a	multitude	of	incentives,	ideologies,	factors	and	processes,
which	go	beyond	dominant	arguments	about	failed	reintegration	processes	or	‘Big	Men’	mobilisation	efforts	in	search
of	an	increase	of	their	bargaining	power.	If	we	want	to	unravel	the	complexities	of	circular	return	and	to	develop
adequate	responses,	we	need	to	integrate	ex-combatants	agency	and	the	long-term	effects	of	prior	mobilisation	into
our	frameworks	of	analysis.	Their	readiness	to	return	to	combat	indeed	is	largely	influenced	by	past	and	present
experiences,	including	social	and	political	challenges	faced	with	after	leaving	armed	groups.	These	experiences	not
only	explain	the	appeal	of	return	but	also	the	different	difficulties	ex-combatants	face	when	trying	to	re-integrate	into
their	communities	but	also	the	blurred	boundaries	between	different	social	spaces.	Long-term	armed	mobilisation
should	be	considered	a	process	of	socialisation.	The	presence	of	armed	groups	should	be	seen	as	a	moment	of
social	rupture	as	much	as	an	experiment	in	constituting	a	new	social	space,	a	new	way	of	life,	a	new	form	of	social
capital,	and	eventually	a	new	identity.	Ex-combatants’	consequent	capacity	to	navigate	between	different	spaces
largely	defines	their	response	to	new	political	or	security	dynamics,	to	mobilisation	and	demobilisation	campaigns,	or
to	their	own	individual	challenges	and	ambitions.
Find	out	more	about	the	Politics	of	Return		and	our	Trajectories	of	Displacement	research	projects,	which
are	based	at	the	Firoz	Lalji	Centre	for	Africa	and	funded	by	ESRC/AHRC.
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The	views	expressed	in	this	post	are	those	of	the	author	and	in	no	way	reflect	those	of	the	Africa	at	LSE
blog,	the	Firoz	Lalji	Centre	for	Africa	or	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science.
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